

THE TOPIC OF THE ISSUE

FROM HATE SPEECH TO HATE LANGUAGE

War waged with words and pictures

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Unfortunately, nobody among those who initiated this language, who were developing it to the level when it became part of our everyday life to such an extent that we are not aware when we are actually using hate speech, was not held legally responsible.

Trying to answer the question how do nations get involved in war, after World War I a German journalist came to the conclusion that it is first the politicians who lie to the journalist, and then begin themselves to believe in these lies when they read them in the media.

What I would add is that war does actually start at the point when journalists themselves begin to believe in the lies which they were consciously producing together with the politicians. I think that the majority of us here present have witnessed such a development. Unfortunately, we keep living with these journalists and their lies. In Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina it can be heard that it is the journalists who started the war. Here it is forgotten that these journalists were doing only what the politicians were wanting them to do.

Propaganda has been part of our lives for centuries. The propagandist uses all means available to send a message which should reach as many people as possible. But particularly dangerous is political propaganda, because those who are making use of it most often do stop at nothing, especially if their aim is war, which was the case in Yugoslavia and states established after this country's disintegration.

Awarded Propagandists

Hence, the aim of political propaganda which began to spread throughout Yugoslavia at the end of the eighties was war. And judging by everything what happened, I think that we can agree that this was a case of very successful propaganda. I say successful not only because it fulfilled its aim – war, but because this propaganda has not been eradicated ever since. Only now it has a different aim – to maintain fear of those present and to justify the crimes which were committed.

Journalists, just like politicians, have massively used hate speech which has developed such deep roots in our everyday language that I think that nowadays we can notice that in Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, and probably also in Kosovo, hate speech is still in use.

Unfortunately I must repeat, however, that nobody among those who initiated this language, who were developing it to the level when it became part of our everyday life to such extent that we are not aware when we are actually using hate speech, was not held legally responsible.

It is said that crime committed by words is very hard to prove. This wording is used by all those who claim that this is the reason why until now not even one propagandist was punished, although both in national and international law there are legal grounds to sanction those who propagate hatred and war. In my view, as well as in the view of many others, in the end the perpetrators of these crimes are awarded. Nowadays they are editors, directors in the media, they teach journalism. Some of them have built successful political careers. And words spoken by these people did kill, they literally did kill.

We can trace the roots of political propaganda which resulted in war back in the beginning of the eighties, namely immediately after Josip Broz Tito's death. Political propaganda, which will lead to war, emerged in times when the state began to weaken economically. In our area, political propaganda started in Belgrade. In the mid-eighties, hate speech created in Serbia's media had initially focused upon Albanians. Media got overflowed with stories about victims and culprits, with reports full with stereotypes, and of some of them we haven't got rid until today.

Propagandists use primarily the information media, counting on the human need for information which is particularly strong in insecure times. People simply need information in which they can easily believe, and which will come from a source which they can trust. There are many examples of the beginnings of this hate speech in the eighties, but I have chosen two as an illustration – a photo and fabricated

information. The photo has the title "Mother from Prekale", which was published in 1987. The photo shows a woman with a rifle on her shoulders, surrounded by children. The story attached to the photo was saying that this was a Serbian family in Kosovo which was forced to carry weapons in order to defend the children from Albanian nationalists.

This was an open message on the sacrifice of one nation, and the woman/mother was used as a symbol to show the most vulnerable component of the society.

Another big story from the media, which was very remarkably present in all Yugoslav media is the information related to the killing of a number of soldiers in a barrack of the Yugoslav People's Army. The "Keljmendi Case", as we remember it. The media story referred to an Albanian who came to a dormitory and killed a group of Serbs. As we were told, the motive was pure hatred in regard to Serbs, and the Albanians were presented as ultimate criminals and enemies of this people, and a threat for the others in Yugoslavia.

The public did not have the possibility to check any of these two stories which were served in such a way that it was easy to believe in them. It was clear that both of them were created in political centers and published by the obedient journalists.

Such pictures, together with politicians' stories and an emerging widespread fear led to the "happening of the people" or mass rallies.

Who said "war"?

Printed and electronic media passionately and markedly (in marked places in printed media, and at the very beginning of main broadcasts in the electronic media) follow the "Truth rallies" everywhere around. Propaganda is doing its best to offer good photos, with faces in the forefront and placards with slogans such as "We want weapons!", "We go to Kosovo!"; the TV networks were screening faces and the most vehement participants in the rallies, and presented were also orators' slogans.

For media in Belgrade these were the breaking news in many months. Zagreb and Ljubljana already then started to pay less attention to these events, namely they do not report in the same way like Belgrade. This is how a specific media war started, and it was later gradually transferring to the society.

Media follow these reports and base their stories on exaggeration and praising the people. The biggest public rally certainly was that in Gazimestan, Kosovo Polje, in June 1989, when for the first time the possibility of war as a potential solution for the Yugoslav situation was mentioned from a rostrum.

Media in other republics, particularly printed media, presented the entire situation in a way that was differing from the way in which the capital was addressing the audience. This is particularly the case in Slovenia, first of all the paper "Mladina". They were the first to side with Kosovo Albanians, and already then it was not unusual to read texts on Slovenia's independence. The media in Serbia were the first to answer to these writings and the called them also fascists.



Zvornik

Apart from pictures from Sarajevo, the audience in Serbia did not see also pictures and information related to ethnic cleansing of part of Bosnia. This was the case with the town Zvornik, which the Serb forces occupied in 1992. Thousands of people were lying dead in the streets of this little town after the Yugoslav Peoples' Army and the paramilitary forces entered the town. Serbian media said that the town was "liberated", showing the mosque with the Serb flag and the loudspeakers from which the music of the March to Drina was heard, which was to associate the audience with the courage of the Serbs both in the past and nowadays. Except for the Serbian media, no other reporter could enter Zvornik for months.

Three years later, in 1991, war started in Slovenia and it ended very quickly, although formally speaking it ended only in 1999 in Kosovo.

Hate propaganda was strongest in Belgrade, but the other republics, i.e. the newly established states which were starting to declare independence one after another, were also not immune. In terms of

methods, centers of political power were creating propaganda in very similar ways. For all politicians who came to power the most important aim was to get control over the media and to appoint their supporters for the leading posts in the media.

What Milosevic does in Serbia, Franjo Tudjman does in Croatia, and Alija Izetbegovic in Bosnia. The first battle in the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina was fought over TV transmitters – the Yugoslav People's Army was controlling most of them, and it gave them away to Karadzic's Serbs, helping thus the Serb radio and TV network to start working.

WE against THEM, THEY against US

During the war, political propaganda was different from the one before the war. Media focus on stories related to victims and culprits, them and us, and the pictures were getting bloodier and crueler. The language itself, and the photos, become more emotional in order to provoke reaction. All methods and all weapons, so to speak, are permitted. The propagandists and those who work for them are asked to perform maximum creativity.

A very interesting propaganda tactic, which was during the war almost equally used by Sarajevo, and by Belgrade, and by Zagreb, and which had deceived many at least in Bosnia-Herzegovina, was to leave room for those opposing the regime to speak freely. By giving no significance to the opponents, by letting them speak, the regime shows how insignificant they are and is sending a message that actually in their words there is no truth and that therefore they do not deserve to be denied or silenced.

In the part of Bosnia-Herzegovina which was controlled by the government in Sarajevo, even in times of war there was officially no censure. Freedom of speech enabled the media, mostly the independent ones, to write and talk about issues which were of interest to them, with rather frequent criticism in regard to the authorities. The ruling Party of Democratic Action most often did not criticize negative writings. Silence was the method used by all (and it is often used today as well) in order to minimize the significance of the media and to stress the righteousness of their rule. Many independent journals were deceived by this method, and they were saying also in public that the non-imposition of censure was one of the positive sides of this party's rule.

Those who were analyzing political propaganda and hate speech in our region in the beginning of the nineties have identified also some other common features.

Mythology is a crucial feature of successful political propaganda in our region. This is nothing new, because Hitler's propagandists were doing the same during World War II. Propagandists implement stereotypes, they manipulate emotions, and they use myths to link events from the past with the present, wanting in this way to convince people that these invented stories were part of their history. The battle for Kosovo remains the best example, namely the way in which Emperor Lazar and his fight for the Serbs were linked to Slobodan Milosevic. The other myth which marked the nineties is the one relating to the thousand years long dream of Croatia, by which again all those who were receiving the message were reminded of the past, the fights for independence and the endangerment of one side by the other one.

In order to reach the goal, the propagandist needs lies. Hitler was saying that the bigger the lie, the bigger the chance that somebody will believe in it. His chief propagandist Joseph Goebbels recommended the use of partial truth and not to avoid speaking of things which are correct, though difficult to check.

Hate speech, i.e. political propaganda, is used by wrongly pronouncing the opponent's name or by giving names which members of the other nation consider to be mocking or inappropriate (like Sqiutar for Albanians, Balia for Bosnian Muslims...).

Linguists said that creators of hate speech make new phrases, which gradually become parts of our language. Words and phrases which were describing events in our surrounding, which we found difficult to comprehend and accept, became part of our language. War terminology, which we all have accepted from the media, implies words like neutralization, human relocation, ethnic cleansing, aggressor, enemy, genocide, ustasas, chetnicks, Serb-chetnick's armada, ustasha-like government, Islamic state Bosnia, Mujahedins, peace talks, Alia's warriors, ustasha fascists, Islamic ustaschas, jihad-warriors...

Successful political propaganda uses all possible available methods. So, in our case the propagandist used music and most frequently the so-called turbo-folk music which praised war and "war heroes". This is how Thomson, Knindja-little Ninja, Ceca and many others emerged; it is difficult to mention all of them in all ethnicities. They are always linked to ruling political options and in fact they promote nationalism. Unfortunately, other musical styles have also not remained immune to political propaganda, but this one had biggest expansion and therefore is the most influential one.

The statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia gives precise instructions regarding whom and because of what to suspect for war crimes. The Statute gives also the legal basis for raising indictments against journalists, Article 4.c. – direct and public incitement to commit genocide... Also, Article 7 (individual criminal responsibility), para. 1 – “person who instigated... or otherwise aided and abetted”. However, even ten years after the war ended not one indictment was raised.



They like would want to separate....

Ivica Puljic reported of a young, frightened soldier on the front line somewhere in Slovenia. The soldier spoke with a clear Bosnian accent.

Journalist – How do things go?

Soldier – It’s all fucked up and horrible, this is how they go.

Journalists – Do you know whom you are fighting?

Soldier – I only know that they are shooting at us.

Journalist – Who are “they”?

Soldier – Probably members of the Territorial Defense, and the others.

Journalist – And do you know why this war is waged, why this battle is fought?

Soldier – How should I know? They, like, want to separate, and we, like, do not allow them to.

(Report of JUTEL, private archives, the date is not mentioned in the film, but this was happening sometimes between June 25-29, 1991, during the ten-day war in Slovenia).

This is one of the first stories from the battlefield. Even nowadays it illustrates the state of mind of the Yugoslavs who, although exposed to strikes of political propaganda from different centers, were not yet ready for what was to follow.

The task of the national courts

There is growing mention of the idea of lustration in the territory of the countries which emerged after Yugoslavia disintegrated. As a process, lustration was already carried out in some east-European countries and is most often defined as “the removal of those who oppose democracy or those who violated human rights in the old regime” from public functions. Lustration has been completed in Poland, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria and Romania. Processes which were rather similar were organized in South Africa after apartheid and in Germany after World War II (de-nazification, de-fashisation).

Of course, journalists must abide by their professional code. What happened in the case of wars in Yugoslavia is an example of unprofessional conduct of the journalists who until then were treated as “social-political workers”.

Journalists, who in Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia were taking part in spreading hatred which encouraged killing, were consciously doing so. That they did have a choice demonstrate the others – those who instead of siding with the government had sided with professionalism.

In SFRY and the countries which emerged after its disintegrated the TV networks were bombing people with photos and words which the propagandists had arranged with the aim to create hatred where there was none, and an atmosphere of fear which was to incite the need for defense and eventually make the recipients of this message commit crime, disregarding basic human values.

Both politicians and journalists have their share of responsibility for the horrors which the wars and the awakening of nationalism in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia have produced.

And this is the truth which blames the media, and because of which participating journalists must be held responsible. Though, however, one should not forget that it was the centers of political power which created, developed and controlled hate propaganda, and that therefore these politicians must also face responsibility.

Nowadays in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia and Croatia it is not hard to notice that the war time propagandist has achieved the final goal by transforming hate speech to hate language. Political propaganda has reached its climax causing people to keep quiet or to ignore guiltiness for war crimes. The main message which the propagandists on all sides were sending was the one on national sacrifice; this message is still present, and is often used as an excuse for refusing cooperation with The Hague

Tribunal or the national courts.

The Hague Tribunal was not able or did not want to raise indictments against journalists from Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina or Croatia, although many think that this, too, is necessary. National courts which deal with war crimes have also not yet tackled the media, and it seems that this task is left to them and that they shall have to fulfill it. If not for some other reason, then because many of those who were until yesterday "killing" from TV networks, continue to work in the media, and some of them have even become politicians, or are trying to become. No society which wants to be a democratic one, which wants to guarantee prosperous life, can either advance or be satisfied with such a situation.
Sarajevo, September 2007

LAWS ON THE MEDIA IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA, SERBIA AND CROATIA AND TRIALS AGAINST THE MEDIA

TV Belgrade's report from the battlefields in Croatia, probably some time after the fall of Vukovar, in November or December 1991. The camera shows closely faces of young soldiers in military T-shirts. One of them has bloody scars on his face. The faces are not visible, but from behind the cameras come voices, one belonging to a women, the other to a man. The two of them are talking to the soldier.

Female journalist – Are you ready to cooperate with us?

Soldier- Yes, I am.

Female journalist – You have betrayed the Army and SFRY. How are we to trust you?

Soldier – Three of my friends are in custody. If you want, I can kill all three of them. I can kill two of them and spare the third one. Or, I can kill only one of them. This is how I can prove that you should trust me.

Female journalist – So, you are ready to kill your comrade soldiers?

Soldier – Yes!

In his essay on laws relating to hate speech, Gabriel Eckstein says that these are the laws which "prohibit any type of hate speech; labeling groups, harassment and accusation". Today, as well as in times of war, in Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Croatia, there are legal possibilities to prosecute people who are spreading hate speech and ideas of hatred. International law is also opposing these methods. In all three countries in which there had been war there did exist laws and rules relating also to the protection of human rights, and laws which regulate the use of hate speech.

In SFRY all media were controlled by the branches of the League of Communists. In Tito's times was established a system of public information which was characterized by strong decentralization, and the aim was to guarantee each culture the right to expression. So, each republic had its own media, and the Yugoslav Radio Television, with the headquarters in Belgrade, served as some kind of coordinator. Later, such a form of organization proved to have been convenient for nationalists which were taking over control of the media.

Tito's regime established also a Commission for ideological activities and Commission for political and propaganda activities and information. Freedom of speech was guaranteed by the 1974 Constitution. However, there was no free access to information, and there were laws which forbid foreigners to publish certain materials, and a law which prohibited critics on account of Josip Broz Tito's image and results. Regarding the freedom of media the situation was not at all a simple one in these times, but for the purpose of this research I concentrated upon hate speech in Bosnia-Herzegovina before the war, during it and nowadays. Immediately before the war the new federal law allowed for private ownership and then, apart from state television and its republic branches, some municipalities, towns and private persons started their own media. After elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1990, control over media moved from the communist authorities to the hands of the politicians from parties which came to power, most of them with a nationalist mark. Although there were attempts to pass a new law, the draft of which was assessed as controversial, Bosnia-Herzegovina started war without a unified act on the media.

In 1992 the official government in Sarajevo took over control of Radio-Television of Bosnia-Herzegovina (RTVBH). As the Government included representatives of a number of parties and national groups, people who remained in RTVBH were also in a way reflecting the multiculturalism of Bosnia-Herzegovina. As the war unfolded, the Party of Democratic Action as the party holding the majority of power in the territory controlled by the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, takes over control of RTVBH and makes use of the opportunity to do what Milosevic and Tudjman in their neighborhood had already done. Apart from interfering with the editorial board's policies, SDA appoints the director, first Mufid Memija and then Amila Omersoftic, both of whom were active members of the Party.

The forces under control of Karadzic, with assistance from the Yugoslav People's Army, occupied a big number of transmitters in the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, by which they enabled Radio-Television of Serbia to be the main broadcaster. The other option was Serbian Radio Television, which was broadcasting from the premises in Pale, where Karadzic's Government had its headquarters. The program was strictly controlled and harmonized with the members of the Serbian Democratic Party. In the remaining part of Bosnia, hence the part under control of Croatian forces, the audience could watch the program of Croat Radio Television from Zagreb, and a few local TV networks which, as a rule, were nationalistic. Laws which would regulate the contents of programs of electronic media, as well as of the printed media, just like many other laws simply did not exist or, if they did, they were not respected. The media in Bosnia-Herzegovina at the beginning of the nineties produced an image of chaos in which the entire country found itself, and were showing a war led by means of political propaganda. In the years after the war, a few important media related laws were passed in Bosnia-Herzegovina; free access to information was regulated, which is particularly significant for the local media. After 1999 the Press Code for the media was also adopted according to which all journalists and editors, as well as owners of the media, have only moral obligations. Article 1 of the Code says: "Journalists and their publications have an obligation to the public to maintain high ethical standards at all times and under all circumstances. It is the duty of journalists and publishers to respect the needs of citizens for useful, timely and relevant information and to defend the principles of freedom of information and the right of fair comment and critical journalism. ...

On the other hand, Article 4 speaks of the prohibition to use language which would incite discrimination, stressing that "newspapers and periodicals must avoid prejudicial or insulting references to a person's ethnic group, nationality, race, religion, gender or sexual orientation or to any physical or mental illness or disability." There also exist rules for electronic media, whose implementation is monitored by the Regulatory Media Agency.

War in which rifles are not the only weapon

The former editor in Radio Television of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the moderator of the central news – News at 7.30 p.m. – on April 2, 1992, began with the following words: "Good evening. It has not yet been officially announced, because the scale is still balancing, but in parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina there is war going on, and this should be said so! This is war against innocent civilians; this is war against our children. This is war against all of us. We are not mutually killing ourselves, it is rather they are killing us. Do not listen to rumors. Do not believe anything except what you see with your own eyes. This is war in which rifles are not the only weapon."

Journalists in front of courts

The Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia gives precise instructions regarding whom and because of what to suspect for war crimes. The Statute gives also the legal basis for raising indictments against journalists, Article 4.c. – direct and public incitement to commit genocide... Also, Article 7 (individual criminal responsibility), para. 1 – "person who instigated... or otherwise aided and abetted". However, even ten years after the war ended not one indictment was raised.

At the round table in October 2001 in Sarajevo What should we do with freedom of information, the journalists had maybe for the first time analyzed the role of the media in the war. The spokesperson of ICTY Florence Hartmann said on this occasion that not one indictment was raised against the journalists in The Hague, because there is no evidence indicating direct participation of journalists in genocide and ethnic cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Some indictments indicate that ICTY was aware of the existence of political manipulation. This is the case with the indictment against Slobodan Milosevic, which says – 25, g) "He controlled, manipulated or otherwise utilised Serbian state-run media to spread exaggerated and false messages of ethnically based attacks by Bosnian Muslims and Croats against Serb people intended to create an atmosphere of fear and hatred among Serbs living in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina which contributed to the forcible removal of the majority of non-Serbs, principally Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats, from large areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina."

In a broadcast of Radio Free Europe in 2001 Florence Hartmann was asked whether there is a possibility to raise indictments against journalists in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and she answered that ICTY does not have adequate documentation to prove participation, but that officials in The Hague are convinced that the media did play an important role in all that was happening.

"Since we are aware of the role of the media in times of war, parts of the indictment against Milosevic consider media as a weapon used for committing certain crimes. Unfortunately, this is not a separate case as is in trials for crimes in Rwanda where there are some indictments against directors or ministers of information, some media and journalists who were directly participating in everything that was going on. For Yugoslavia, we do not have a completed dossier on media."

The Milosevic indictment is not the only one not to mention the role of the media. The document with the title General Background, A. The Origin of the Muslim-Croat Conflict (October 1992 – March 1994), 1. The case for the Prosecution; c) Croat Nationalism, Militancy and Propaganda, part 48: "The Prosecution explained the rise in discriminatory attitudes on the part of Bosnian Croats towards the Bosnian Muslims as, in part, the product of a campaign of virulent anti-Bosniac propaganda by the Bosnian Croat TV stations and authorities. Witness S testified to the pro-Croatian and anti-Bosniac propaganda spread by Vitez TV under the patronage of the HVO, and the increasing emphasis on the division between Bosniacs and Croats."

On effects of this propaganda indirectly is talking also the British journalist Anthony Loyd in the book "My War Gone By, I Miss It So". Traveling through central Bosnia, Loyd met an elderly woman which, as he puts it, poured at him a "tirade against Islam".

Thousands of Arab mujahedins are wandering through the mountains, she told me. They radicalized the consciousness of the Bosnian Muslims, who are now joining jihad, the holy war, against endangered Croats who had for such a long time been humiliated under the Osmanli Turks. Bosnia is now the European border for the battle against fundamentalist Allah's legions, and those who defend it are the brave, bandits' descendants, who are fighting for Christianity... If I, as a relatively impartial stranger, who has free access to media, can be scared from local propagandists and those who were spreading fear, I can imagine what the methods they were using do to isolated rural communities which do not have access to information, who do not have experience with impartial media, and are leaning upon the voice of local media in the search for truth."

In the countries which were affected by war, and emerged with the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the public believes that journalists carry great responsibility for everything that happened and finally also for the disintegration of the common motherland. The Croatian intellectual Ivan Zvonimir Cicak said at one occasion how the word can be more lethal than the bullet. "Once written, it becomes even stronger, because it remains for a long time. The bullet kills once, one, two, three, five persons. But words can destroy the entire community." Ivan Colovic from Belgrade expressed a similar standpoint when writing about words in one of his books. He is writing that pronounced adversaries of war can trace the beginning of the conflict in ideas and words which were easily spread around.

Two big trials against journalist marked the period after World War II. The last judgment was issued in 2003 in front of the International Court for crimes committed in Rwanda. The Court sentenced three journalists for genocide and for calling for promotion of hatred, and killing. In Rwanda in 1994 800.000 people were killed who were belonging to the Tutsi tribe. The Court panel concluded that the accused had been using radio broadcasts and a fortnightly in order to promote ethnic hatred which incited massacres in churches, schools, hospitals and on barricades. The broadcast which in Rwanda was known under the name Radio Machete led the killers to the victims, it broadcast the names of the Tutsis who were hiding, the numbers on the plates and the places where they had been hiding. Two journalists were sentenced for life, and one of them to 27 years in prison. "The power of the media to create and destroy human values goes together with huge responsibility", said the judges on the day when the judgment was issued. "Those who control the media are responsible for the consequences". So, Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza and Hasan Ngeze became the first journalists in new history to get high sentences for the misuse of the media.

The best known media trial in the last century was a part of the trial against the Nazis in Nuremberg related to Julius Streicher, the editor and publisher of the semi-pornographic and anti-Semite paper Der Stürmer. His paper was promoting hate against the Jews. He was declared guilty and sentenced to death by hanging. The verdict says: «... for his ...speaking, writing, and preaching hatred of the Jews, Streicher was widely known as 'Jew-Baiter Number One.' In his speeches and articles, week after week, month after month, he infected the German mind with the virus of anti-Semitism, and incited the German people to active persecution... With knowledge of the extermination of the Jews in the Occupied Eastern Territories, this defendant continued to write and publish his propaganda of death... Streicher's incitement to murder and extermination at the time when Jews in the East were being killed under the most horrible conditions clearly constitutes persecution on political and racial grounds in connection with war crimes, as defined by the Charter, and constitutes a crime against humanity."

Genocide live

Serbian Radio Television had almost live broadcasts of the genocide in Srebrenica, or at least of parts of what had happened. The cameramen and journalists came to the city together with the soldiers of the Republic of Srpska. First images were broadcast on July 16, 1995, namely five days after the town was occupied. All the films were carefully edited so that killings were not seen, and the army was presented as a liberation army and as a just army.

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